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Human development has moved to centre stage in development theory. Education 
makes an important contribution to economic growth, but achievement of mass education is 
important for a number of other reasons as well. Inequality of access to education is a 
serious issue everywhere, and serves to reinforce the inequality of income. Inequality is 
evident from the viewpoint of socio-economic background, of gender, and of regional 
disparities. In a poverty alleviation programme, tackling regional inequalities in education 
may be crucial, yet it raises many issues. Will expanding educational opportunities only 
result in frustration if appropriate jobs are not available? Is the key role of education in poor 
regions to enable educated young people to migrate elsewhere to find better jobs? 
In international comparisons, Pakistan appears well behind comparable countries in 
educational development. “Path dependency” means that the legacy of past deficiencies in 
expanding education will adversely affect Pakistan’s development for decades to come, and 
what is done now in education will affect development for half a century. A simple 
projection shows that even with the highly optimistic assumption that by 2030, Pakistan will 
reach the enrolment rates currently achieved in the United States, the proportion of the 
working-age population in that year with no education or only primary school education 





Edi is growing up on a small farm in an isolated part of the poor Indonesian 
province of East Nusatenggara. His parents are not the poorest of the poor; they have 
a few head of livestock. They are illiterate, but they sense that education is the key to 
their children escaping poverty. There is a primary school in the village—not a very 
good one, to be sure. In Edi’s class, the blackboard is cracked, teaching aids are non-
existent, the teacher is not well trained and has to do other things besides teach 
because of his intermittent receipt of what is, anyway, a very low salary. 
Only naturally bright children and those whose parents are better off than 
most overcome this disadvantage and proceed to lower secondary school. This costs 
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a bit more—both school fees, uniforms, and snacks. Happily, Edi does not have to 
pay for transport. The school is only four kilometres away, so he can walk it in 40 
minutes if he hurries. His parents are nervous about letting his sister walk so far to 
school, however, so they have withdrawn her.  
This lower secondary school is better than the primary school that Edi 
endured. But there are not many textbooks, and the teacher is not very well trained. 
There is a lot of rote learning, a lot of teaching of national ideology and not enough 
reading, writing and arithmetic. 
Edi is an intelligent boy, and he would like to continue to upper secondary 
school and perhaps even to tertiary education. But the nearest upper secondary 
school is a long way away—in the town, and transportation is too infrequent and 
expensive for daily travel to be an option. Edi must move to the town if he wants to 
continue in school. But he has no relatives in the town, so he must search for a 
family that will take him in while he goes to high school. Some of his friends found 
families that would do this, but only on the arrangement that they work as glorified 
household servants while not in school. Because they were always tired, and were 
given little time to study, their school performance was not satisfactory, and some of 
them had to drop out.  
A few of them managed to graduate from upper secondary school, but the cost 
of enrolling in the province’s government university was too high for the family to 
afford. If they had wanted to go to a better university in Java, the cost would have 
been even higher.  A couple of students from Edi’s district did make it all the way to 
university in Java, but they never returned.  
Hasan lives in Jakarta. His father is a middle level civil servant, and he has 
managed to put Hasan and his siblings through high school and get Hasan enrolled in 
a reasonable university. Hasan is not as intelligent as Edi, but he has managed to get 
through, assisted by some paid coaching by teachers in their spare time. Through 
some contacts of his uncle, he has a good chance of finding work in a private firm 
after he graduates.  
Perhaps you recognise parallels in the Pakistani context to the story of Edi and 
Hasan. The issue of inequality of access to education by socio-economic background 
is probably a universal phenomenon, but one with particularly serious implications 
for development in poor countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan. Aside from 
considerations of equity, there are important implications for productivity and for 
regional development when intelligent children miss out on educational opportunities 
simply because of their socio-economic background or their place of residence. 
Patterns of government expenditure on education, unfortunately, serve to reinforce, 
rather than offset, the inequalities of access just described. Substantial public 
resources are devoted to tertiary education, which is accessed almost exclusively by 
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It is important to recognise just how widespread the problem is. In my own 
country, the advantage gained by young people who can afford to go to expensive 
private schools is clearly demonstrated in the distribution of scores in the 
matriculation examination taken at the end of secondary school in the state of 
Victoria (see Figure 1). The tiny area of overlap in the distribution of scores of 
government school and private school pupils is really striking. It is highly unlikely 
that the 90 percent of public school students who score below the marks achieved by 
80 percent of students in non-Catholic private schools are less intelligent than these 
students. It is more likely that they have more supportive home backgrounds and a 
higher level of motivation, and that the standard of teaching and facilities is better in 
the schools they attend.   
Inequality of access to educational opportunity is just one of the issues of 
human resource development in developing countries. In this address, I will touch 
briefly on a number of others, particularly those related to regional development and 
poverty alleviation.  
 
HUMAN CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
Over the past 15 years, human development has moved towards centre stage 
in development theory, being incorporated into the mainstream of economic growth 
theory in studies such as those by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986). The new theories 
endogenise the rate of technological advance through human capital accumulation, 
most notably through formal schooling or through informal skill development on the 
job. In the learning-by-doing models, moreover, the accumulation of human capital 
generates externalities. All of these models make the rate of physical capital 
accumulation an increasing function of the level of human capital, and some make 
the rate of human capital accumulation an increasing function of the level of human 
capital. Empirical support for the new endogenous theories of growth appears to be 
quite favourable [Ogawa et al. (1993), pp. 3-5; Barro (1991); Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1995), Chapter 12]. Importantly, the initial human capital situation appears 
to be important in subsequent economic growth; for a given level of GNP, large 
differences in initial human capital endowments imply very different current growth 
performance. In other words, the past history of schooling matters.   
It is not the movement of this issue towards centre stage in development 
theory that is important. It could just as easily move away again as the dictates of 
theoretical fashion change. What is important is whether human capital is indeed 
crucial in development. There do seem to be obvious connections between economic 
growth and human development.  
On the one hand, economic growth provides the resources to permit sustained 
improvements in human development. On the other, improvements in the quality of 
the labour force are an important contributor to economic growth [Ranis et al. 
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But, as Ranis et al. note, while the two-way relationship between human development 
and economic growth may now be widely accepted, the specific factors linking them 
have not been systematically explored, and nor have priorities in the phasing of policy. 
The connections between human development and economic growth are not automatic, 
and their strength depends on a large range of factors—including, on the government 
side, the appropriateness of the economic policy setting, and the proportion of GNP 
devoted to priority social expenditure by the government; and on the household side, 
the more income households allocate to human development at a given income level. 
The latter is likely to be related to the level of female education and to female control 
over income within the household. There is now abundant evidence that education, 
particularly female, tends to improve infant survival and nutrition [Thomas (1990); 
Schultz (1993), pp. 68–73]. Where women control cash income, expenditure patterns 
appear to be geared relatively more towards human development inputs, such as food 
and education [Ranis et al. (2000), p. 198)].   
Ranis  et al. (2000) hypothesise that economies can be on a mutually 
reinforcing upward spiral, with high levels of human development leading to high 
growth and high growth in turn further promoting human development. 
Unfortunately, they can also be on a downward spiral or stagnant situation in which 
poor performance in human development tends to lead to poor growth performance, 
which in turn depresses human development achievements. If the linkages between 
human development and economic growth are weak, lopsided development may 
result: for example, good economic growth may not bring about good human 
development if there is a low social expenditure ratio; and good human development 
performance may not generate good economic growth if investment rates are low. 
Lopsided development of this kind is unlikely to persist. Either the weakness in 
economic growth or human development will eventually act as a brake on the other, 
leading to the downward spiral already described, or the weak links will be 
strengthened, leading to the upward spiral.  
Empirical investigation by Ranis et al. shows that a majority of countries are 
in the downward spiral category or the lopsided category where human development 
is not leading to strong economic growth. Those countries in the desirable upward 
spiral category are mostly in East Asia. Unfortunately, according to Ranis et al. 
categorisation, Pakistan over recent decades has fallen in categories either of 
lopsided development, under-emphasising human development, or the downward 
spiral. They note that Pakistan, like Egypt, had low public expenditure on education, 
partly due to heavy expenditure on the military, and its human development 
performance suffered especially from discrimination against females.   
 
REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN POVERTY 
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Not only do countries differ widely in their levels of poverty and human 
development, but regional differences within countries can be very marked. On the Gavin W. Jones  394
whole, there appears to be a strong correlation between poverty and low levels of 
human development. This is evident in India, where Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which 
“remain backwaters largely untouched by the economic energy rippling through 
other parts of the country” [Dhume (2000), p. 24)] also happen to be among the 
states with the lowest levels of education [see also Saxena (1989)]. In Thailand, in 
the early 1970s, progression rates from lower to upper elementary school varied from 
less than 20 percent in some remote rural districts to over 80 percent in other more 
central districts [Bennett (1971)], with corresponding differences in the proportion of 
trained teachers. In Indonesia, too, enrolment and progression rates, examination 
scores and proportion of trained teachers tend to be lowest in the least advanced 
provinces and districts.  
I confess to not knowing enough about regional development in Pakistan to be 
able  to  say  much  about  such  issues  in  relation  to  Pakistan. The  data in Table 1 
indicate quite wide urban-rural and inter-provincial differences in educational 
enrolment ratios, but by no means a perfect correlation between educational 
enrolment ratios and provincial per capita income levels. They indicate particularly 
wide gender differences in educational enrolment ratios in North West Frontier 
Province and Balochistan. Presumably even wider differences could be observed if 
the data were available for districts rather than for only four provinces that have wide 
differences in circumstances in their component regions.   
It should also be noted that the gap between educational opportunities in 
different regions observed in quantitative data is likely to appear even wider if 
differences in quality of schooling are taken into account. This was hinted at in the 
introductory section of this address. It has also been stressed in the literature [e.g. 
Behrman and Birdsall (1983)]. 
The question is, what causes what? It could be argued that Ranis et al. 
downward spiral is operating in the poor provinces; lack of resources at the 
government and family levels make it hard to keep a high proportion of children in 
school, and the lack of well educated workers holds back development in these poor 
provinces.  
But it is not quite as simple as this. If it were, finding the resources and 
educating the people would ensure more rapid development. However, in the 
province of East Nusatenggara in Indonesia, where I conducted fieldwork, the jobs 
available for those completing secondary school or tertiary education were very 
limited indeed. Such young people wanted government jobs, but the reality was that 
fewer than 10 percent of them could hope to find such jobs in the province. There 
were also very few large firms needing workers with completed secondary 
education, and relatively few opportunities for productive self-employment [Jones et 
al. (1998)]. Therefore raising secondary school enrolment ratios in the province was 
unlikely to have major direct effects in raising provincial productivity. Table 1 
  Pakistan: Human Development Indicators, by Province 
  Pakistan  Rural Urban Punjab Sindh NWFP  Balochistan 
Per Capita Income (Rs) 1996-97  5903  5401  7137  6193  6432  4417  4994 
Female  LFPR  13.6  16.3 8.4  17.5 6.2 9.4  4.6 
% Male Employment in Agriculture 1996-977  40.7  57.3  5.6  40.6  37.7  43.1  53.9 
Dependency Ratio 1981  95.3  99.2  86.0  93.5  93.9  102.3  106.3 
Dependency Ratio 1998  87.3  95.6  72.7         
Height/Age (% Stunted)  60.1  61.2  57.6  62.6  53.6  60.1  55.2 
Weight/Height (%Wasted)   9.5  9.4  9.8  10.1  9.5  9.2  3.6 
Adult Literacy Rate (Male)   59  52  73  57  65  20?  54 
Adult Literacy Rate (Female)   31  20  56  34  35  56?  16 
Primary School Gross Enrolment Ratio (Male)  76  70  95  81  64  82  68 
(Female)  60  49 92 69 48 51  41 
Secondary School Gross Enrolment Ratio 
(Male)  
53  47 65 47 61 58  65 
(Female)  27  13 55 27 39 13  14 
Infant Mortality Rate   89  95  73  95  95  62  86 
Child Mortality Rate (Male)   18             
(Female) 23             
Access to Safe Drink. Water (%)  22  9  50  18  29  27  20 
Floor of House Brick/Cement 1996-97  33  22  58  38  32  15  15 
Note: All figures for 1998-99 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, unless otherwise stated. 
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A word here about the demand for education, which may be particularly 
relevant in relation to regional development issues. At the primary school level, once 
you have made enough school places available, you can ensure that most of these 
places will be filled, by the simple device of making education compulsory. But the 
further up the education system you go, the harder it is to enforce compulsory 
education. In Indonesia, the goal is to make education compulsory at the lower 
secondary level.  So far, this is not possible, because there are not enough schools 
and teachers. But there are also strong indications that, compulsory or not, there will 
be resistance on the part of many parents to sending their children to lower 
secondary school, unless the quality of these schools is better than it is at the 
moment. The financial costs of schooling at this level are higher, as are the 
opportunity costs. In the regions, young people can get wage work in a whole range 
of activities without needing much education. And the well-paying jobs that a high 
school education might net them are few and far between.  
The evidence about demand for lower secondary education no doubt varies 
widely across countries. To continue with the Indonesian example, however, from 
the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, lower secondary school enrolment ratios actually 
declined despite strong pressures to raise enrolment ratios at this level. The decline 
was concentrated in low-quality private schools that had opened in the hope of 
profiting from the expected growth in demand. Parents proved resistant to paying 
increasing school fees in these poor-quality schools.  
 
THE HARD QUESTION: WILL RAISING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
IN POOR REGIONS REDUCE THEIR POVERTY? 
A question that is at the core of regional poverty problems is: will raising 
human development in poor regions enable their economies to develop and perhaps 
narrow the poverty gap between themselves and richer provinces? A hard-nosed 
approach to answering this question is that, just as it is better to concentrate capital 
investment in wealthier provinces where its productivity is likely to be higher (a 
policy apparently followed in China, for example), so too should educational 
investments be concentrated in these provinces. Then people will move to the 
wealthier provinces, both to seek better educational opportunities and to seek work 
after finishing their education, leaving a smaller proportion of the national 
population in the provinces requiring transfer payments to maintain some kind of 
welfare standard.  
The model of concentrating capital investment in the favoured regions of the 
country has downsides in terms of a trade-off of equity for growth, and potential 
social unrest. The model of concentrating educational investments in these favoured 
regions has similar downsides—costs of moving to the better opportunities and the 
uncertainties of finding work are borne by the people already disadvantaged by 
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The alternative, that of providing more education in the poorer provinces, 
however, could well lead to as great a volume of migration, because of the shortage 
of job opportunities for the better educated in the poorer province. But this is not 
necessarily an argument against expanding education in poorer provinces. Better 
educated workers at least have a better chance of assessing their prospects and 
finding employment niches after they have moved. Not only that, but there are other 
important reasons for expanding education in the poor provinces. Some of these are 
to do with indirect effects of education that are often under-valued in cost-benefit 
type calculus. One such indirect route to increased household incomes may be 
through the remittances sent by educated young people who had migrated to other 
provinces or overseas to obtain suitable work. Another may be increased incentive 
for investment in the province once more educated young workers are available, 
particularly in light of the lesser concerns about unionisation of labour in such 
provinces. Others include all the positive effects of education on child survival, 
nutrition, and lowered fertility that are well documented in the literature.  
 
THE ISSUE OF GENDER AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 
The Programme of Action agreed on at the International Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo in 1993 gave considerable attention to the 
need to raise educational enrolment ratios for females. Indeed, it gave so much 
attention to this issue that John Knodel and I wrote a paper [Knodel and Jones 
(1996)] reminding readers that in significant swathes of the world (notably Latin 
America and South-East Asia), there is little difference between males and females 
in these enrolment ratios. We emphasised that in such regions, inequity of access to 
education by socio-economic background is far more important than inequity of 
access according to gender.  
My only worry when writing that paper was that its message could be 
misinterpreted by planners in South Asian countries to mean that they could take a 
leisurely approach to expanding girls’ education. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. In a country such as Pakistan, not only is inequality of access by socio-
economic background a serious issue, but it is compounded by much lower levels of 
school enrolment for girls than for boys. Progress needs to be made on both fronts. I 
have already argued the case for improving access to schooling by children from 
poor families and those living in isolated areas. The case for expanding access by 
girls is the strong evidence that educating girls has an independent impact on child 
mortality, child health and nutrition, schooling and cognitive development of 
children, and reduced fertility [Schultz (1993); Bledsoe et al. (1999)]. In general, this 
impact is greater than that obtained by educating boys. It is not entirely captured by 
the educated individuals and their families, but has wider pay-offs to the society 
through pathways such as greater technological progress and faster economic 
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Another more general effect of extending education to more of the female 
population seems to be increased participation of women in paid employment. This 
appears to be linked with the greater confidence education brings to women, its 
effect in breaking down attitudes favouring female seclusion, and the sheer economic 
loss involved in keeping educated women out of the workforce. This last effect could 
be crucial for Pakistan. Not only does Pakistan have very high dependency ratios as a 
result of its continuing high birth rates, but also these ratios underestimate real 
dependency, because a very low proportion of Pakistani women are in the workforce, 
at least as conventionally measured.  
 
OVERCOMING PAKISTAN’S HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT DEFICIENCIES 
If we use other major Asian countries as comparators, Pakistan remains 
severely disadvantaged by its failure to achieve higher levels of human resource 
development. Limited schooling facilities thirty years ago are reflected in the poor 
educational level of today’s labour force, in continuing high fertility rates, and in 
other ways. Failure to educate today’s children will continue to affect the educational 
composition of the labour force 50 years from now.  
The notion of path dependency is relevant here. Today’s options are closely tied 
to past events. Path dependency, of course, arguably operates in many fields—for 
example, political development and economic structure. Perhaps the dead weight of the 
past is less deterministic in political development, where sharp discontinuities are at 
least theoretically possible. In terms of economic structure, path dependency is not 
quickly overcome: infrastructure or factories, once in place, are not so easily shifted, or 
closed down. But it may be in demographic terms that path dependency is hardest of all 
to escape. Cohorts move up the age pyramid with almost glacial speed: today’s 
children will be in their prime working ages 30 years hence; today’s prime workers 
will be the elderly 40 years down the track. The education of these cohorts is already 
determined. On-the-job training, and ‘learning by doing’ can alter their productivity, 
but adult education programmes that alter their basic literacy and numeracy are usually 
given greater rhetorical than practical support. Thus the education given to Pakistan’s 
young people today will have a key bearing on the level of social and economic 
development that will be reached decades into the future.  
A basis for considering the longer-term issues facing Pakistan because of the 
low level of school enrolment ratios at present is a projection of the educational 
attainment of Pakistan’s population, on the assumption that adult education 
programmes will not basically affect the level of education reached by people as 
children. Lutz et al. (2000) have projected the educational attainment of the 
population of the world and various regions. I have used some of their results, and 
projected the educational attainment of Pakistan’s population using similar 
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attained by youth cohorts (aged 15–19 and 20–24) remains as it is in 2000; the other 
in which the levels attained increase in a linear fashion so that by the year 2030 they 
reach those currently obtaining in the United States (with all children receiving at 
least some primary education, 98 percent receiving at least some secondary 
education, and 55 percent entering tertiary education). This assumption is probably 
unrealistic in the case of Pakistan; over the 1990s, enrolment ratios do not appear to 
have risen very much.
2 To reach American levels of education in three decades 
would require a dramatic expansion of education at all levels, training of massive 
numbers of school teachers and lecturers, and sharply increased levels of government 
expenditure on education. But this does not matter—the projection is for illustrative 
purposes only.  
The results of the projections are shown in Figure 2, which compares Pakistan 
with China. The differences are striking, and stem mainly from the much stronger 
educational base China has presently achieved. Therefore if the status quo is 
maintained over the next three decades, the overall educational attainment of China’s 
adult population will not be too bad. By contrast, mere maintenance of the status quo 
in Pakistan will leave the adult population seriously educationally disadvantaged 
throughout the projection period.  
The more striking finding, however, is that even if the unrealistically rapid 
progress required to reach American levels of enrolment rates by 2030 is achieved, 
the legacy of the current low educational enrolment ratios would still be holding 
down the average educational attainment levels of the adult population of Pakistan. 
The proportions of the well educated, while they will be rising sharply in the younger 
age groups, will remain very low in much of the year-2030 workforce, particularly 
those aged above 40, and particularly for women (Figure 3). Overall, the proportions 
of the year-2030 working age population with different levels of education would be 
as follows: 
 
 China  Pakistan 
 (%)  (%) 
No Education  4  18 
Primary School  25  17 
Secondary School  56  36 
Tertiary Education  14  29 
 
2School enrolments at ages 5-15 (6-15 in 1996-97) rose from 54.1 percent in 1990-91 to 59.8 
percent in 1996-97, according to figures in two major demographic surveys conducted in those years 
[NIPS (1992), Table 3.6; Hakim et al. (1998), Table 3.6a]. Other data suggest an actual fall in net primary 
school enrolment ratios between 1991 and 1999 [Kazi et al. (2001), Figure 1], the outcome of rising 
enrolment ratio for girls but a declining ratio for boys [Federal Bureau of Statistics 1998, cited in Sathar et 
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Interestingly, these projections reflect the fact that Pakistan at present exhibits 
a more heterogeneous pattern of educational experience than does China. Both the 
proportion of the uneducated and the proportion of the tertiary-educated are higher in 
Pakistan in the younger age groups,
3 and this influences the distributions of 
educational attainment projected to 2030.
4 The most striking aspect of the projection, 
however, is that 30 years from now, even if enormous strides are made in expanding 
all levels of the educational system, 35 percent of the adult population of Pakistan 
would still have either no education or primary school education (which includes 
religious education). In other words, the legacy of past under-investment in 
education cannot be quickly cast off.    
 
TO WHAT EXTENT WILL PAKISTAN’S DEMOGRAPHIC 
SITUATION HINDER EDUCATIONAL ADVANCE? 
Progress in raising the proportion of children moving to secondary schooling 
in Pakistan can be expected to be closely linked to progress in lowering fertility 
levels. There are mutually reinforcing feedbacks here [Jones (1990)]. Lowering of 
fertility makes it easier (after a small lag) to include higher proportions of children in 
the school system. Raising the educational level of young people—especially 
females—entering reproductive ages also tends to reduce fertility [Sathar and Mason 
(1993)].   
Fertility in Pakistan did not decline much through the 1990s, whereas in Iran 
and Bangladesh, the 1990s was the period of very rapid declines in fertility (in 
Indonesia, it was the 1980s). Pakistan’s population growth will therefore be much 
higher than that of the other countries. Even for the medium variant used by the 
United Nations in their projections, the fertility assumptions look extremely 
optimistic (a fall in TFR from 5 in 1995-2000 to 2.9 in 2015-20). For the low 
projection, TFR is assumed to reach 2.5 in that year. Yet even the low projection 
would give Pakistan much faster growth than the medium projection gives either Iran 
or Indonesia—almost a doubling in just 40 years, between 1995 and 2035. 
There are enormous benefits to be gained by a continuation of the recent 
modest decline in fertility in Pakistan [Sathar and Casterline (1998)]. Some of these 
are clearly apparent in the size of the educational task. Population projections for 
Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia (see Figure 4) show that Iran and Indonesia are both 
experiencing declines in number of school-age children. But Pakistan is still facing 
an  enormous  task—a  60  percent  growth  in school-age children by 2025. The task  
 
3It is possible that there is some inconsistency between the data used for Pakistan (projected from 
Hakim et al. (1998), (Table 3.5a) and the data from China. Strangely, the Chinese projections show no 
tertiary educated young people at ages 15-19.  
4The higher proportions with tertiary education in Pakistan are also influenced by the younger age 
structure of the projected Pakistan population, meaning that the educational attainment of the adult 
population is more heavily weighted by the better-educated younger age groups.   Gavin W. Jones  404
facing Pakistan is even larger if it is kept in mind that it lags these other countries in 
enrolment ratios. As a telling example, if all three countries wished to achieve net 
enrolment ratios of 70 percent in the high school ages by the year 2010, this would 
not require any enrolment increase at all in Iran, a 24 percent increase in Indonesia, 
but a whopping 77 percent increase in Pakistan.
5 The sharp differences stem from 
two sources: the rapid growth in numbers of school-age population in Pakistan, and 
its greater distance from achieving the 70 percent goal.  
Much more could be said about demographic impacts on other aspects of 
human resource development and economic growth in Pakistan. Absorbing the 
growing labour force into productive employment will be a major challenge, 
particularly if educational levels of large numbers of labour force entrants remain 
low. In the era of globalisation, the Pakistani labour force needs to be internationally 
competitive. Yet despite facing problems of rapidly growing labour force, Pakistan 
also faces the problem of high dependency ratios—that is, the ratio of its dependent-
age population to its working age population. These ratios are a third or a half as 
high again as those in countries of South-East Asia. And even these do not reflect the 
failure to utilise the female workforce in Pakistan. But this means Pakistan can reap 
great benefits in terms of falling dependency ratios if it can lower its fertility rate and 
bring more of its women into productive employment.  
 
FINAL ASSESSMENT 
Of all the challenges facing Pakistan, the need for human resource 
development appears to be one of the most crucial. Perhaps one indicator of the low 
priority given to human development is the poor state of Pakistan’s educational 
statistics. These appear to be incomplete and conflicting from one source to another. 
Symbolic of the problem is the inclusion of Pakistan among relatively few countries 
showing a blank—indicating data not available—for net enrolment ratios in the 
World Bank’s latest World Development Report. To make rapid progress in 
educational development in Pakistan will require action on a number of fronts: 
increased educational budgets, expansion of teacher training facilities, and building 
of new schools, to increase the capacity to accommodate more students; generation 
of increased demand for education; and support for programmes to lower fertility so 
that increasing numbers of children do not overwhelm the capacity to educate them. 
The generation of increased demand for education takes seven words to say, but 
major social and economic change to achieve. To ensure the appropriate emphasis on 
human resource development in Pakistan will require concerted action on the part of 
both government and civil society.  
 
5The enrolment ratios on which these estimates are based are fairly rough, but the wide 
differences in required enrolment increases would certainly still hold if more refined estimates were 
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It is difficult to provide an interesting discussion of a paper one really likes. 
This paper provides a well-balanced and nuanced description of the relationship 
between schooling, population growth and income growth and thus makes a valuable 
contribution to the assessment of human development policies. One of the themes of 
the paper is that household resources, geographic access to schools, the quality of the 
schools and a demand for schooled workers all matter with respect to the amount of 
schooling attainment one sees in an economy. This is in contrast to many policy 
prescriptions, which usually emphasise one specific barrier to schooling as if its 
removal alone were both necessary and sufficient to enhance schooling achievement. 
The most prevalent view is that the low quality of schools or lack of access to 
schools are key factors holding back schooling, but this ignores, for example, 
whether there is a well-functioning economy in which skills acquired in school are 
actually rewarded. 
The paper also contains demographic projections that well illustrate the value 
of demographic methods. In this case they show that even under the most optimistic 
scenarios in which all conditions favourable to increased schooling are improved in 
Pakistan, because of demographic inertia the growth in average schooling attainment 
will be moderate. This does not mean of course that efforts should not be made to 
alter policies that affect schooling, only that expectations about the short-run should 
be dampened down. 
I do have three brief comments on some of the details of the paper. First, I 
think that the discussion of the evidence concerning the non-market returns to 
increasing the schooling of women needs to be modified. The principal evidence is 
the pervasive finding that maternal schooling is positively related to children’s 
schooling and health. What we do not know much about, however, is the mechanism 
through which this works, and this matters very much for predicting the 
consequences of a policy aimed at augmenting the schooling of women. One 
possibility is that mother’s time spent with children is an important input in their 
human development, and that this time is more productive if the mother has more 
schooling. However, in many societies increased schooling for women has led to 
their greater labour force participation, with possible reductions in the time spend 
with children. Thus, it is not obvious what the net effect will be when women’s 
schooling is increased. Comments  408
There is some new evidence on the complex relationship between female 
schooling, female labour force participation and child outcomes. Behrman, Foster,  
Rosenzweig and Vashishtha (1999) show that in rural India after the onset of the 
“green revolution” rates of labour force participation of women outside the home 
remained at low levels and did not very significantly with female schooling. In this 
setting, there was a strong relationship between maternal literacy and children’s 
study time and women who were literate commanded higher bride prices (paid lower 
dowry) in the marriage market in areas of India in which the returns to male 
schooling were higher—literate mothers were valuable “producers” of the human 
capital of boys. Thus, in a setting in which there are few opportunities for women to 
make use of their skills in the labour market, the returns to those skills are confined 
to the home and reflected in the next generation, but are nonetheless valuable as long 
as skills acquired by men (sons) are rewarded. 
In contrast, in the United States where there is a strong positive relationship 
between labour force participation and schooling for women evidence based on 
mothers who are identical twins [Behrman and Rosenzweig (forthcoming)] suggests 
that once the fact that abilities are inherited is taken into account, increased maternal 
schooling is somewhat negatively related to children’s schooling attainment. The 
positive relationship one observes across generations in maternal schooling and child 
schooling in the United States thus appears to be due solely to the fact that high 
ability mothers tend to have high ability children. Increasing the schooling of women 
in the United States would therefore not raise the schooling level of the next 
generation, although it would have a return in the labour market. The same evidence 
suggests that increasing the schooling of fathers in the United States would increase 
the schooling attainment of children. The mechanism, though, is the time that 
mothers spend with children—the evidence suggests that the wives of more educated 
husbands tend to work less and spend more time with children. So, we cannot say 
what the consequences of increasing the schooling attainment of women would be in 
Pakistan—that depends on what happens in the labour market both in terms of the 
demand for skills and opportunities for the employment of women. 
I like very much the section on regional inequality, particular its attention to 
both labour and capital mobility. Many analyses assume immobility of both factors. 
This assumption leads to policies that can lead to a substantial misallocation of 
resources—putting more resources in “depressed” areas in which the returns to such 
investments are low, for example. The analysis in the paper might be benefit, 
however, from a clearer distinction between income, wealth and investment returns 
or opportunities. For example, the paper suggests that it might be desirable to 
concentrate investment in wealthier provinces. That could be, but only if such 
provinces have higher investment returns. In fact, provinces with high wealth might 
already have large capital stocks relative to labour and thus low returns to capital 
investment. Examining the spatial mobility of production factors and remittance Mark R. Rosenzweig  409
flows across areas and how mobility is affected by area-specific investments is an 
important area of research. Obviously, the limited province-specific data examined 
in the paper is just a preliminary look. The potential is great, however, with good 
data for a study of regional mobility. 
The demographic projections contained in the last part of the paper are 
valuable, as I have noted, in showing the importance of demographic factors in 
assessing the future impact of policies. However, the analysis give the impression 
that high fertility is the cause of lower levels of schooling, and maybe even poverty. 
My own view is that there is no fundamental strong causal relationship between low 
levels of schooling levels, fertility and poverty. Rather, all three are symptoms of one 
very important, root factor—the lack of rewards from or returns to investments in 
skills in the economy. If the government creates an environment in which new ideas, 
technological innovation and capital investment can be rewarded so that the returns 
to schooling rise [Rosenzweig (1995)], households will respond by investing in skills 
and will also lower their family size in order to do so. Just as governments face 
higher expenses to improve schools and schooling infrastructure when there is a 
larger population of potential students, so too do households face a trade-off between 
numbers of children and investments in each child. The difference is that the 
evidence suggests that when households have incentives to invest in their children’s 
skills, they can and do limit their fertility. 
As emphasised in this paper achievements in human development and 
economic growth depend on many different policies, pertaining to school building, 
capital, labour markets and even international trade, as all of these factors affect the 
returns to investing in skills. This comprehensive, holistic analysis of human 
development and growth is the right basic approach and should form the basis for 
policy formulation in Pakistan and elsewhere. 
 
Mark R. Rosenzweig 
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It is a privilege to be a discussant on Gavin Jones’s paper on “Human 
Resources, Poverty, and Regional Development”. I have admired Dr Jones research 
and I am at a disadvantage as a discussant because there is very little in his paper 
with which I disagree. In fact I whole heartily welcome the message he has carried 
forth today in his paper. But rather than merely congratulating him on an important 
and thought provoking piece I will try to the best of my ability to take some of his 
assertions forward, particularly by placing this lecture in the context of Pakistan’s 
realities in 2001. 
The problem as I see it is that Pakistan has clearly missed the opportunity, 
despite impressive economic growth up till the 80s to invest in human development. 
Our development policies were squarely based on the belief and expectation that 
economic growth was paramount and the benefits of economic well being would 
translate themselves into human resource development almost as an unquestionable 
sequence. THAT UNFORTUNATELY HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE. We all know 
the fall outs fairly well: low enrolment rates despite recent rises, IMR is still high aid 
close to 90 per 1000 live births, and we still have a very uneducated labour force. 
I remember in this very room, 8-9 years ago, 2 illustrious lectures by World 
Bank VP Lawrence Summers, and World Bank Director Nancy Birdsall the 
following years. Both echoed the same message all too clearly. Pakistan has under-
invested in Human Resources, Human Development was a compelling necessity for 
Pakistan to sustain growth and also to ensure other important benefits such as lower 
fertility and mortality, which in turn would allow better investments in people. In 
plain terms it appears that Pakistan “bought” higher growth in the short run at the 
expense of development outcomes such as human development, political stability 
and well being in the long run. 
The message which had been echoed with in Pakistan and by the Consortium 
of donors was accepted by GOP. The realisation was fairly profound, the policy 
instrument which came to be was the Social Action Programme starting in 1992 to 
redress the neglect of the social sectors. This programme is in its second phase at the 
moment. So the early 90s brought with them the radical change in government policy 
in the form of Human Development, raising public expenditures and protecting 
social sector spending. Education was the core of SAP particularly emphasising 
expansion of primary education. 
While the donors have collectively promoted greater expenditures on 
education because of their expected positive outcomes on growth and other Comments  411
development benefits, the problem was not so easily solvable. Basically I do not 
think (and that is perhaps the major difference in opinion between Gavin Jones and 
myself) that increasing educational enrolments is such a flexible policy lever. Let me 
step back briefly to education history. The politics of education is quite central to 
understand in the Pakistani contest. In 1947 we inherited a colonial tradition (where 
the èlite was highly educated but the base was very small). The structure remains 
essentially unchanged as the base has not broadened ENOUGH. Urban èlites have 
ensured high quality education for their children in private schools while the feudals 
in rural areas have had strong reasons to hinder the spread of education in their 
constituency because of its lessening their hold on availability of agricultural labour. 
But above all education and all Human Development has been sacrificed at the 
expense of huge defence outlays. 
On the other hand what about private initiatives to supplement public 
education efforts?  One problem has been that remaining a dominantly agricultural 
society and barring few spouts of  demand of skilled labour in urban areas and the 
Middle East, the demand for a skilled labour force has been weak.  There is still little 
educated youth boys (leave alone girls) can do in rural Pakistan. 
In this context the SAP was the first jolt and Gavin Jones is reiterating the 
need to invest in human capital before its too late.  The figures he provides us about 
catching up with enrolment rates in the next few decades are daunting if not 
seemingly impossible to achieve.  But let us analyse a bit more why prospects are 
daunting? Pakistan clearly would like to move from a vicious   cycle of poor human  
investments, low development, and economic returns to a virtuous circle of high 
investment in human capital, sustainable development etc. What is required of 
countries like Pakistan to move into an upward spiral from their current downwards 
spiral? 
Is it enough to build new schools and increase the number of educational 
institutions? Here Gavin Jones poses an interesting  choice: do we distribute 
resources evenly or do we locate them where there are better returns to schooling and 
deal with under served areas later? In one way this did happen with SAP which 
tended to favour the set up of schools (even though some of then were ghost schools) 
in Punjab, the already best endowed province. District differences are tremendous 
and reflect the heterogeneity in how different regions have different capacities to 
allocate and absorb resources.  There are suggestions in the literature that devolution 
helps more effect distribution of resources towards human development. If this is so 
perhaps the devolution plan will help. 
My other hunch is that schooling rates are better and schooling quality 
superior where the returns to schooling are perceived to be high. Urban/rural 
differences in Pakistan are a case in point but even within Punjab there are huge 
difference in enrolment rates in barani areas and between North and South Punjab.  
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education. Cultural differences may be more important than any other indices for 
education such as seen in the North-South divide in social indicators in neighbouring  
India. 
But let us turn more seriously to the issue of differences in human resource 
development by class.  The latest Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (1996-97) 
survey shows persistent inequalities by class, six years after the SAP.  Just in the 
Punjab 49 percent of boys were fully immunised compared to 66 percent in the 
richest quintile; enrolment rates were correspondingly, 41 percent and 77 percent in 
the poorest and richest groups respectively.  Inequalities by class and gender are 
even larger in the other provinces. 
So the question is whether public policy by itself is sufficient to ensure that 
the poorer households are reached and that outcomes improve? Whereas public 
policy is aimed to ensure that there are more and better public services the question 
is whether the flow of resources is equitable and efficient and whether it reaches the 
poorest of the poor who it is intended to subsidise? I do not think public policy in a 
politically polarised country is generally able to achieve that aim and SAP was no 
exception. 
Two points are important in this regard: Institutions determine the extent to 
which the poor can put pressure on government officials to allocate and use 
resources, but above all the delivery of public services to the poor suffers when they 
do not have leverage over policy-makers. In other words the poor suffer 
DISPROPORTIONATELY from failures and breakdown of governance and 
accountability. 
Let me elaborate my point. Apart from the generalised increase in demand for 
education (which I think is the major change and opportunity for a turn around in 
social development), there has been a notable rise in demand for quality of 
education. In fact much of the rise and fall and differentials in enrolment rates reflect 
actual and perceived difference in quality of schools. While physical infrastructure, 
textbook availability is an important indicator of quality there are some which are 
critical. In a recent piece of research where we looked at quality indicators of rural 
schools we collected 30 or more indicators (such as pupil/teacher ration, experience 
of teachers, school infrastructure etc.) It was the indicator which measured the 
presence of the teacher on the day we visited the school which was most significant 
in explaining enrolments. Here private schools fare better. Even with less qualified 
less experienced teachers, private schools were preferred by parents because they 
demand the presence of a teacher more than in case of government schools. 
Lastly, let me pick up and emphasise the point that human development alone 
is not enough, gender equality in human development is an absolute must. Gender 
inequalities in human development are far worse in Pakistan and Nepal than even the 
rest of Asia [HDR (2000)]. In Gustav Ranis and F. Stewart article quoted by G. 
Jones and where they discuss lopsided development, Pakistan is an outstanding case Comments  413
of development which is lopsided towards economic development rather then human 
development. In particular they argue this is exacerbated by military expenditures 
and from gender discrimination. 
The spin offs of redressing gender inequalities are huge. The loss extends 
from one generation to the next. As pointed out by Gavin Jones, a generation of 
educated mothers will turn around enrolments, it will change household expenditure 
and decisions in favour of reducing fertility and infant mortality and disparities by 
gender in children enrolment. The centrality of gender issues has struck me in every 
possible piece of research I have undertaken lately. For example in a study of 
investment in children and family building, the community level which triggered a 
rise in contraceptive prevalence (controlling for income, parental education, 
development) was the presence of a girls school not a boys school, nor total number 
of schools. 
I think I will stop here I hope that the comments are helpful in taking the 
debate further from reiterating that we should invest in education to how we can do 
this given the complexities of trying to do this in the last 7-8 years. It is challenge for 
us and we are a decade wiser. We are faced with dwindling resources, but we have 
Sri Lanka and even Bangladesh in the region, which have a better record despite 
more adverse economic situation. So there are many lessons to draw from. We have 
finally started our fertility transition and despite all, we see a grounds well of 
demand for schooling expenditure for girls. So there is no reason why we cannot 
consider past failure carefully and move forward more vigorously. 
 
Zeba A. Sathar 
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